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ABSTRACT
Extensive evidence compiled over the past decade demonstrates that many species of
animals respond negatively to inequity across several different contexts. One context that
remains unexplored is whether inequity responses are influenced by the experimenter.
Experimenter effects remain an enduring concern within animal research. I investigated whether
the presence of the experimenter influences responses to inequity in a nonhuman primate species,
the capuchin monkey (Cebus apella). In the presence or absence of an experimenter, monkeys
worked in pairs to complete a computerized task, following which individuals received rewards
that were either equal or unequal in comparison to the partner’s rewards. Monkeys had difficulty
learning the task, but after learning, rates of refusals were influenced by the individual reward
received rather than the social comparison or the actions of the experimenter. I consider reasons
for their frustration with the task and their subsequent lack of an inequity response in this
context.

INDEX WORDS: Inequity, Experimenter, Experimenter effects, Capuchin monkeys, Cebus
apella, Computerized task

THE EFFECTS OF AN EXPERIMENTER ON THE RESPONSE TO INEQUITY IN
CAPUCHIN MONKEYS (CEBUS APELLA)

by

SARA A. PRICE

A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of
Master of Arts
in the College of Arts and Sciences
Georgia State University
2014

Copyright by
Sara Alexandra Price
2014

THE EFFECTS OF AN EXPERIMENTER ON THE RESPONSE TO INEQUITY IN
CAPUCHIN MONKEYS (CEBUS APELLA)

by

SARA A. PRICE

Committee Chair:

Committee:

Sarah F. Brosnan

Michael J. Beran
David A. Washburn

Electronic Version Approved:

Office of Graduate Studies
College of Arts and Sciences
Georgia State University
May 2014

iv

DEDICATION
I would like to thank my family and friends for all of their support. Special thanks to my
parents (Lisa and Vince), siblings (Andrew and Adrienne), and Matt McBride.

Thank you to the monkeys that participated in this study – in memory of Drella.

v

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Foremost, I would like to thank my advisor, Sarah Brosnan, and my committee members,
Mike Beran and David Washburn, for their guidance and support. Special thanks to Mike Beran
for assistance with the computer program and Ted Evans for assistance with apparatus design
and construction. Thank you to Laurent Prétôt, Kelly Leverett, Darby Proctor, and everyone else
at the Language Research Center for their guidance and assistance. Finally, this work would not
be possible without support from the 2CI University Doctoral Fellowship in Primate Social
Cognition, Evolution & Behavior.

vi

TABLE OF CONTENTS
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ............................................................................................. v
LIST OF TABLES ........................................................................................................... ix
LIST OF FIGURES .......................................................................................................... x
1

INTRODUCTION...................................................................................................... 1
1.1

The Inequity Response ........................................................................................ 3

1.2

What Does Inequity Look Like in Other Species? ........................................... 5

1.2.1 Individual vs. Social Contrast......................................................................... 6
1.2.2 Task.................................................................................................................. 8
1.2.3 Subjects’ Relative Position and Control of Reward Distribution .................. 9
1.3

Experimenter Effects ........................................................................................ 10

1.3.1 Unintentional Cuing and Reinforcement..................................................... 11
1.3.2 Relationship with the Experimenter ............................................................. 16

2

1.4

Inequity and Cooperation ................................................................................. 17

1.5

Purpose ............................................................................................................... 19

GENERAL METHODS ........................................................................................... 20
2.1

Subjects and Housing ........................................................................................ 20

2.2

Computer Task .................................................................................................. 21

2.3

Setup ................................................................................................................... 23

2.4

Conditions .......................................................................................................... 27

vii

3

STUDIES 1-5, METHODS AND RESULTS ......................................................... 28
3.1

Study 1 ................................................................................................................ 28

3.1.1 Study 1 Methods ............................................................................................ 28
3.1.2 Study 1 Results .............................................................................................. 28
3.1.3 Study 1 Discussion ........................................................................................ 28
3.2

Study 2 ................................................................................................................ 29

3.2.1 Study 2 Methods ............................................................................................ 29
3.2.2 Study 2 Results .............................................................................................. 30
3.2.3 Study 2 Discussion ........................................................................................ 30
3.3

Study 3 ................................................................................................................ 31

3.3.1 Study 3 Methods ............................................................................................ 31
3.3.2 Study 3 Results .............................................................................................. 31
3.3.3 Study 3 Discussion ........................................................................................ 34
3.4

Study 4 ................................................................................................................ 34

3.4.1 Study 4 Methods ............................................................................................ 34
3.4.2 Study 4 Results .............................................................................................. 35
3.4.3 Study 4 Discussion ........................................................................................ 35
3.5

Study 5 ................................................................................................................ 36

3.5.1 Study 5 Methods ............................................................................................ 36
3.5.2 Study 5 Results .............................................................................................. 36

viii

3.5.3 Study 5 Discussion ........................................................................................ 38
3.6

Combined Data .................................................................................................. 38

3.6.1 Combined Data Results................................................................................. 38
3.6.2 Combined Data Discussion ........................................................................... 41
4

GENERAL DISCUSSION ....................................................................................... 42

REFERENCES ................................................................................................................ 51
APPENDICES ................................................................................................................. 61
Appendix A .................................................................................................................. 61

ix

LIST OF TABLES
Table 1. Summary of modifications made across studies. ........................................... 22
Table 2. Summary of the different test types and conditions. .................................... 26
Table 3. Results for analysis of contrasts for refusals ................................................. 41

x

LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1. Diagram of the joint testing box (front view) ............................................... 24
Figure 2. Diagram of the joint testing box (side view) ................................................. 25
Figure 3. Overview of mean refusals out of 60 trials across the 8 conditions in Study
3 (n=4) .............................................................................................................................. 33
Figure 4. Overview of average reaction time and average completion time across 60
trials in the 8 conditions in Study 3 (n=4) .................................................................... 33
Figure 5. Overview of mean refusals out of 60 trials across the 8 conditions in Study
5 (n=4) .............................................................................................................................. 37
Figure 6. Overview of average reaction time and average completion time across 60
trials in the 8 conditions in Study 5 (n=4) ..................................................................... 38
Figure 7. Overview of mean refusals out of 60 trials across the 8 conditions in
Studies 3 and 5 (combined data, n=8) ........................................................................... 40
Figure 8. Overview of average reaction time and average completion time across 60
trials in the 8 conditions in Studies 3 and 5 (combined data, n=8) ............................. 40

1

1

INTRODUCTION

Several species of animals respond negatively to inequity, and research continues to
explore how this response is influenced by different external factors. The negative response to
inequity occurs in several primate species (Brosnan, 2006; de Waal, 1996; Flack & de Waal,
2000), as well as non-primates (dogs: Horowitz, 2012; Range et al., 2009; Range et al., 2012;
corvids: Wascher & Bugnyar, 2013). One common experimental testing procedure to study the
inequity response involves having animals complete a task with a human experimenter in order
to receive a food reward. Two participants, one acting as a subject and the other as a partner, sit
adjacent to one another in front of the experimenter and alternate participation, allowing them to
observe what tasks the other completes and what reward the other receives (c.f. Brosnan & de
Waal, 2003). Generally, their responses when the partner received a better food reward are
compared to their responses in a baseline condition in which both individuals received a lowervalue food reward, and a negative response to inequity is inferred through the frequency of
refusals to exchange or refusing to consume the food reward.
However, the effect of the experimenter on this phenomenon has yet to be determined. A
major concern in psychology is how experiments are affected by the very artificiality of the
procedures (Davis & Balfour, 1992; Rosenthal, 1963; Rosenthal & Halas, 1962). Do individuals
respond as they perceive the experimenters desire? Are their behaviors influenced by the setup
in ways that human experimenters may not recognize? These concerns warrant a proper
evaluation of what effects experimenters may have on results, both related to the inequity
response and beyond. Experimenter effects have not received much attention in animal research
as compared to human research (Davis & Balfour, 1992), which is problematic since results rely
on overt behavioral measurements rather than introspection. This may be even more important in
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cognitive and behavioral research with captive animals, since researchers often are intimately
involved in the testing procedures. Moreover, the majority of research that has been done on
experimenter effects investigates individual animals’ behavior outside of a social context (Kintz
et al., 1965; McGuigan, 1963), but how might an experimenter affect social animals that must
solve problems in social contexts? The current study focuses on the latter concern in the context
of experimenter-induced inequity.
Anecdotal accounts suggest that the experimenter may play an influential role in the
response to inequity. In his studies on contrast effects, Tinklepaugh described a response in
which the macaque subjects sometimes “looked or even shrieked ‘accusingly’ (if so
anthropomorphic a term may be used) at the experimenter or onlookers” (1928, p. 233) after the
subjects discovered a preferred reward had been surreptitiously replaced with a less-preferred
reward. Also, chimpanzees that are treated inequitably will scream or throw the tokens at human
experimenters instead of the conspecific partner, although these responses are sufficiently
uncommon that they have not yet been empirically explored. Since the response to inequity
requires an individual to pay attention to the rewards that another individual receives as
compared to one’s own rewards, it is important to investigate what role the experimenter may
have in this interaction, and what a response directed towards the human rather than conspecific
might mean. Specifically, is the social comparison alone enough to elicit the inequity response,
or might animals perceive the experimenter as causing the inequity? Therefore, in this study I
explored the influence of an experimenter’s presence on the responses to inequity in one species
of nonhuman primate, the capuchin monkey (Cebus apella). This study implemented new
methodology that enabled an experimenter to be present or absent in order to better determine
whether the experimenter affected the type of response to inequity.

3

1.1

The Inequity Response
Studying the response to inequity can provide us with a better understanding of a related

concept in humans, fairness. The concept of fairness is highly developed in humans and
pervasive in many aspects of our culture. Fairness, defined as the distribution of costs and
benefits from a joint activity, is complex, involving both receiving less (disadvantageous
inequity) and receiving more (advantageous inequity) than another individual (Fehr & Schmidt,
1999; Hatfield et al., 1978). These concepts have been studied extensively in the field of
behavioral economics and psychology, where it has been demonstrated that humans react
negatively to receiving a different outcome than a social partner. Fairness in humans also
incorporates inherent social norms and standards, and ties into complex emotions such as greed
and envy (Fehr & Schmidt, 1999; Hatfield et al., 1978). Fairness is a complex, socially-based
concept that is linked to morality (Frank, 1988), which implies an underlying motivation to
maintain equity and maintain social norms. Although other species do not share the complete
sense of fairness that humans often exhibit, they do show aspects of it, which can be studied
empirically (Brosnan, in press). Additionally, even in humans, we cannot fully understand
“fairness” without understanding its constituent parts. Typically this is done by exploring
subjects’ responses to unequal outcomes, or inequity aversion.
Inequity aversion in humans may be influenced by many things, including an individual’s
culture (Henrich et al., 2001), personality (Colquitt et al., 2006; Wiesenfeld et al., 2007), and the
quality of the relationship between the individuals involved (Attridge & Berscheid, 1994; Clark
& Grote, 2003); nonetheless, these responses are largely present across different societies and
contexts (Haidt, 2012). Aside from behavioral consistency, there is also neurological evidence of
consistent responses to inequity across humans. Unfair offers elicit activity in areas of the brain
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associated with negative emotional affect and physical disgust (Sanfey et al., 2003). Considering
this widespread consistency in multiple domains, inequity aversion may be considered a
universal human cognition (Henrich et al., 2001). Thus, recent research has focused on
examining why this behavior may have evolved – what the function is, why it is of importance,
and what causes the variation we see among individuals and cultures.
A negative response to inequity occurs when an individual’s expectations are violated
based on a comparison of one’s own efforts and rewards with the effort and rewards of a social
partner. These responses to inequity come in different forms. In their typical social interactions,
animals sometimes react in ways that indicate that they are not satisfied with their outcomes. For
example, chimpanzees will often have temper tantrums when they do not receive what they want.
Such tantrums might occur both with kin or non-kin, as for instance when offspring protest if
their mother does not share (de Waal, 1996). These reactions are not limited to feeding
situations. One male chimpanzee would display tantrums when he began losing female support
in a struggle for dominance against another male; when females refused to extend support, or
avoided him, he would throw himself on the ground and roll around screaming (de Waal, 2007).
Such behavior is not limited to primates. Canids have a set of social rules surrounding
social play (i.e. what signals to display, how rough to play), and these rules are maintained as a
group norm (Bekoff, 2001). Social play often involves action patterns used in other contexts, like
predatory behavior, and therefore, it is crucial that canids display signals that demonstrate the
desire to play before initiating these action patterns. Moreover, individuals that follow the social
rules will self-handicap to reduce asymmetries in a play interaction; for example, an individual
may not play as aggressively if the playmate is younger. Individuals that violate these rules or
deceive playmates (such as displaying a play signal but acting inappropriately aggressive
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towards the playmate) are not selected as play partners as often as those who do not violate these
social rules. Ravens also follow a social norm in which an individual that possesses food can
maintain possession in the presence of other individuals; those that violate this norm by
attempting to steal food from the possessor will be attacked in an apparent instance of third party
enforcement (Heinrich, 1999).
Of course such observations are intriguing, but do not provide the level of empirical
support possible through controlled experiments. While we do not expect to see a full sense of
fairness in other species, evidence is building that several species, including nonhuman primates,
share at least some underlying behaviors related to fairness (Brosnan & de Waal, 2012).
Specifically, we can test whether they monitor their own outcomes compared to those of a social
partner, and whether they recognize and respond to discrepancies. Therefore, we can use
nonhuman primates as a model system to study the precursor behaviors from which fairness may
have evolved. We can study elements of fairness in other species, which may someday tell us the
ways in which our own sense of fairness is and is not unique.
1.2

What Does Inequity Look Like in Other Species?
Studies on the inequity response in animals generally measure subjects’ reactions to

getting a different reward as compared to a partner, subsequent to both individuals completing
the same work (Brosnan, 2006a). In the typical procedure, two subjects from the same social
group, seated adjacent to one another, alternate performing a task (such as exchanging a token
with a human experimenter) for a reward. The subject in question receives less than
(disadvantageous inequity) or more than (advantageous inequity) the partner, and their response
is compared to a control condition when both receive the same food reward. The subjects can
easily observe the task that the other individual completes and the reward they both receive
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during these interactions. Behavioral responses generally manifest as negative reactions such as
refusing food rewards or refusing to continue participating in the task, and individuals may even
toss the food reward at the experimenter.
One immediate finding is that the response is quite variable across contexts and
individuals. In fact, responses amongst primates are not always consistent, even within the same
species or within the same study (e.g., Brosnan et al., 2005; Brosnan et al., 2010b). This causes
two problems; first, it is difficult to use a “check-box” approach to determine which species do
and do not show the reaction. This is exacerbated by the fact that procedures and methodology
vary among studies, and it is not always clear how to interpret two conflicting results. Second,
this variability makes finding underlying causes and mechanisms more challenging, as they
presumably interact with other features of the individual, the relationship, and the context.
Past studies on inequity have manipulated one (or more) of several factors to determine
which features are more likely to lead to a negative reaction to inequity. These factors include
the type of task (if any), the seating arrangement of subjects, and the distribution of rewards. One
critical feature that has not yet been manipulated is the presence or identity of the experimenter.
Given that the experimenter is the individual causing the inequity, this seems a critical next step.
1.2.1 Individual vs. Social Contrast
An important aspect in studying inequity is implementing the correct methodology to
more clearly distinguish contrast effects from social comparison effects. Inequity differs from
contrast effects by the referent of the comparison. Inequity is the comparison of an individual’s
own rewards to a partner’s rewards (or social contrast; Brosnan, 2011), while contrast effects are
the comparison of an individual’s current rewards to a previously received reward or something
in the environment (or individual contrast; Reynolds, 1961). Contrast effects were first studied in
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macaques by Tinklepaugh (1928). Monkeys watched as the experimenter hid preferred food
items under cups, which the monkeys could then access the next day. Sometimes, these
preferred food items were surreptitiously replaced with non-preferred items (i.e., lettuce), and
monkeys responded negatively when outcomes violated their expectations (i.e., receiving lettuce
rather than the preferred food item). These contrast effects are widespread across different
species (Range et al., 2012; Roma et al., 2006; Talbot et al., 2011; Wascher & Bugnyar, 2013).
Contrast effects are essential to control for in order to determine whether “inequity” responses
are actually social in nature, or whether the social partner is irrelevant. In other words, it is
possible that in the response to ‘inequity,’ the individual is responding to the presence of a higher
value reward, not to a social partner receiving that higher value reward.
To discriminate these possibilities, many researchers have included controls to
differentiate between inequity responses and contrast effects. For instance, in one common
control, subjects are shown one reward, then provided a different reward after completing a task;
this entire procedure is done while seated next to a partner, who also is offered a different reward
than they eventually receive (Brosnan et al., 2010b). In such tests, chimpanzees and capuchins
do not react as strongly in the control (contrast) condition as they do in the inequity condition,
where the partner received a better reward than the subject. This implies that nonhuman primates
were indeed responding to the social contrast of the situation. On the other hand, squirrel
monkeys show the opposite pattern, responding more strongly to individual than social contrast,
although this is only the case in males; females respond to neither inequity nor contrast (Talbot et
al., 2011). This difference between two very closely related primates (capuchin monkeys and
squirrel monkeys are part of the same taxonomic Family) emphasizes the variability in this
response across the Primates.
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1.2.2 Task
The type of task (or the absence thereof) has a major influence on how subjects respond
to inequity. Nonhuman primates are more likely to respond to unequal rewards when effort in
the form of a task is required than they are to receiving rewards for “free” (i.e., not having to
complete a task to receive the rewards), in which case no response to inequity has ever been
documented (Brosnan & de Waal, 2003; Brosnan et al., 2010b; Brosnan et al., 2011a; Freeman et
al., 2013; Neiworth et al., 2009; Talbot et al., 2011; van Wolkenten et al., 2007).There are
several possible explanations for this. First, studies testing the negative response to inequity
involve captive animals, who regularly receive food provisioned by human caretakers. Food is
often distributed unequally, either because some animals need more or because dominants are
more likely to receive food. The latter may be because they are more likely to come up and
accept food from an experimenter or because they actively block subordinates from receiving
food. As a result, some individuals are accustomed to getting more (or less) food than others and
so may learn that there is no point in protesting food being handed out for “free.”
Additionally, the presence of a task may cue the subject to a context in which sensitivity
to inequity is important. That is, if a purpose of inequity aversion is to help individuals recognize
and avoid those situations in which a partner is receiving a greater benefit for a joint interaction
(e.g., cooperation, see Section 1.4, below), then inequity aversion is more important in contexts
in which there has been joint interaction than those in which there has not. This may cause
individuals to respond differently when they work for the rewards than in those “gift reward”
situations in which no task is present (Bräuer et al., 2006; Dindo & de Waal, 2007; Roma et al.,
2006).
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Therefore, one critical element of designing any study of inequity, including the current
one, is including a task. Although the majority of studies have relied on an exchange paradigm,
recent evidence indicates that individuals respond similarly to different types of tasks (e.g., a
targeting task versus an exchange task; Freeman et al., 2013). Incorporating a task was a
challenge in this study, which was designed to test the role of the experimenter in subjects’
responses, because it required conditions in which no experimenter was present. Exchanges and
other typically-employed tasks are impossible in the absence of an experimenter; therefore, I
developed a computerized task that allowed me to maintain a task even in the absence of the
experimenter (see Section 2.3, below).
1.2.3 Subjects’ Relative Position and Control of Reward Distribution
Small differences in experimental protocols, such as how the subjects are seated with
respect to one another, may make big differences in responding to inequity. Takimoto et al.
(2010) found behavioral differences in capuchins based on visual contact, which suggests that
any sense of separation, either visually or physically, affects behavior. Additionally, orientation
may play a role. There is great variability in responses in chimpanzees and, while multiple
factors vary, one feature that may be important is relative position; individuals responded to
inequity when seated next to one another in a shared enclosure (Brosnan et al., 2005; 2010b) but
not when seated across from one another in separate enclosures (Bräuer et al., 2006; 2009). In
humans, the orientation of the subjects has also proven important (Sommer, 1965; 1967).
Humans prefer to sit opposite one another in competitive tasks, apparently due to a strong
interest in eye contact in a competitive situation, but prefer to sit adjacent to each other in
cooperative ones. Unfortunately subjects’ relative positioning is something that is often beyond
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the control of researchers, particularly with large species such as the great apes (and positioning
may not always affect behavior; e.g., Silk et al., 2005).
Aside from physical orientation, the degree of contact between subjects may play a role.
A vital part of the inequity paradigm is that individuals expend effort on a task and receive the
rewards that are intended for them. Consequently, if the subject that is designated as the
disadvantaged individual ends up stealing the better rewards from their partner (common
behavior from dominant individuals), we will not be able to measure an appropriate response to
inequity. To control this, subjects are often separated from one another (e.g., by a mesh
partition), which reduces stealing without requiring the intervention of the experimenter (which
may also lead to experimenter influences on subjects’ behavior; see Chapter 2). However, this
separation may also inhibit reactions to unequal outcomes, due to decreased proximity between
the animals (Talbot et al., in prep). This creates a problem for studies like the current one,
without an experimenter. Given that capuchins do respond in some situations with a barrier
(Brosnan et al., 2010b; Brosnan & de Waal, 2003; van Wolkenten et al., 2007), I chose to
include a barrier in order to maintain the reward division in the experimenter absent condition.
1.3

Experimenter Effects
A consequence of working with animals in a laboratory setting is that over repeated

interactions, humans and animals form relationships that can affect both the humans’ and
animals’ behavior. Human experimenters may form different behavioral expectations for certain
animal subjects, which may lead to cuing. Moreover, animals can discriminate among humans,
causing them to act differently in the presence of certain individuals based on factors such as
familiarity and the nature of interactions (Davis, 2002), which can ultimately affect cognitive
performance and motivation in tasks (Cibulski et al., 2014). For example, some animals may be
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more neophobic to unfamiliar individuals (Russel, 1973). Research is lacking on experimenter
effects on the response to inequity, although it is an important issue to study for both practical
and theoretical reasons. Below I discuss several of these issues in more detail.
1.3.1 Unintentional Cuing and Reinforcement
A big concern in animal research is that, despite implementing controls to encourage
natural behavior, humans will emit unintentional cues, influencing the animals to act in a certain
way to get a desired result. The effects of experimenter characteristics on animal behavior were
first investigated by Carl Stumpf and Oskar Pfungst in 1904 in the famous case of Clever Hans,
the horse that could ostensibly count. It was determined that unconscious cuing and
reinforcement from the horse’s trainer were driving this behavior (Pfungst & Stumpf, 1907). The
“Clever Hans effect,” in which an animal responds in the way in which the experimenter
seemingly wants the animal to respond, remains an important factor to control for in
experimental studies.
Since that time, researchers have found that experimenters may influence every step of
the experimental process, from implementing the independent variables and handling subjects to
measuring and reporting data (Kintz et al., 1965). A problematic phenomenon occurs when an
experimenter receives feedback from an experiment through observing a behavior or partial
result, creating a bias in the experimenter regarding predictions about general principles and
expectancies for future responses (Rosenthal & Fode, 1963). Although this process is not well
understood, it is possible that the experimental feedback might change the mood of the
experimenter if data contradict the hypothesis or it might exaggerate an interpretation if the data
do support a prediction. Either way, these types of biases run the risk of contaminating
subsequent results and interpretations.

12

One study found that experimenters’ expectancies of what they will observe in subjects
can influence data obtained; experimenters were provided instructions involving what
frequencies of contractions and head turns to expect in planaria undergoing classical
conditioning, and although subjects’ responses were not affected, the experimenters reported the
frequencies that they expected to see (Cordaro & Ison, 1963). In another study looking at rats’
performances in a simple T maze, subjects were randomly assigned to one of two groups of
experimenters. One group was instructed that their subjects were “maze-bright” (bred for
brightness) and the other experimenter group was instructed that their subjects were “maze-dull”.
Despite random subject assignment and arbitrary labels given to the two groups, the supposed
“maze-bright” rats performed significantly better than the “maze-dull” rats (Rosenthal & Fode,
1963). It is possible that the experimenters’ expectancies based on the instructions they received
may have influenced their attitudes, which may have caused differences in signals transmitted
through tactual and sensory modalities or differences in handling the animal subjects. A recent
study specifically assessed how observer expectancies influence subjective scoring of behavior.
Veterinary students applied different scoring methods in which they were shown duplicated
video recordings of the same animals, an original version and a slightly modified version of the
same clip. When scoring the clips, the students were provided either false or correct information
about the conditions in which the animals had been filmed. In all trials, there was evidence that
expectation bias formed from the contextual information provided influenced how the students
scored the identical behaviors they observed (Tuyttens et al., 2014).
Indeed, the way humans handle animal subjects may also cause behavioral differences.
In a study on the effects of alcohol on learning the avoidance response in rats, the alcohol itself
did not produce any differences in results. However, differences were observed based on the
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team of experimenters employed to handle the animal subjects (Harris et al., 1964). Even the
experimenter’s personality and experience level can influence responses. McGuigan (1960)
compared experimenters’ traits scores on personality tests with behavioral scores of human
subjects and found high correlations; for example, subjects performed more poorly with more
neurotic experimenters. In another study, naïve and experienced experimenters each trained a
group of rabbits on a conditioned shock-avoidance response and recorded acquisition speeds.
The rabbits of the experienced experimenters reached criterion faster, and when a naïve
experimenter was provided another group to train, there was a significant practice effect
(Brogden, 1962).
These effects are all based on rather large experimenter influences, but nonhuman
primates may be sensitive even to the eye movements of the experimenter (Povinelli & Eddy,
1996), which means that experimenters must work very hard to avoid unintentional cuing. In
some cases, experimenters have worn sunglasses or baseball caps to avoid cuing by eye gaze
(Call, 2001; de Blois et al., 1998; Pepperberg et al., 1997), but eye gaze is not the only type of
unintentional cuing. Even subtle body movements may provide cues that can alter animals’
performances. This concern is not limited to primates; Johnson (1913) showed that allegedly
successful auditory discrimination made by dogs were actually the result of a reliance on subtle
cues provided by the experimenter, such as respiration, posture, and the tensing and relaxing of
muscles. The dogs were no longer able to discriminate when experimenters who were interacting
with the animals or collecting data were blind to the conditions and desired results.
Not surprisingly, given how good animals are at discerning unintentional cues, they may
also evaluate interactions between experimenters and learn the reputation of an experimenter
based on these interactions. Indeed, several species of primates seem to be aware of others’
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intents and can distinguish between the intentional and accidental acts of an experimenter (Call
et al. 2004; Phillips et al. 2009; Wood et al. 2007). In these studies, typically framed as whether
or not animals can learn reputations, individuals either interact with two experimenters, one of
whom gives rewards (i.e., the generous experimenter) and one of whom does not (i.e., the selfish
one), or watch another individual interact with them. When given a choice between
experimenters, chimpanzees prefer to interact with the generous one whether they have personal
experience with them (Subiaul et al., 2008) or have just watched another chimpanzee interact
with them (Russell et al., 2008). Dogs show the same preference (Kundey et al., 2011; MarshallPescini et al., 2011). It may be that the apes’ and dogs’ ability to learn reputation are based on an
understanding of the experimenter’s intent, either due to advanced cognition or specific selection
to pay attention to human cues, as with dogs (Hare & Tomasello, 2005).
On the other hand, capuchin monkeys, who are also highly cooperative and respond to
inequity, do not discriminate between experimenters who “cheat” by failing to give offered
rewards and those who do not (Brosnan & de Waal, 2009; see also Sheskin et al., 2013).
However, capuchins do clearly discriminate experimenters and pay attention to their behavior;
monkeys look longer at humans who imitate them, and they also spend more time in proximity
and choose to interact more frequently with these imitators (Paukner et al., 2009). Capuchins
also can point to communicate to a cooperative human (Mitchell & Anderson, 1997). Therefore,
if capuchins do take into consideration past experiences with a human, we might expect that
capuchins would respond differently to inequity based on the relationship with a specific human
experimenter.
Like any experimental paradigm, the inequity response may be influenced by
experimenters in the ways discussed above. One concern is that all of the previous task-based
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experiments have required interaction with an experimenter, who distributes rewards to the
correct individuals. This ultimately means that the experimenter must know the condition ahead
of time, so as to provide the correct individual with their respective reward. With this knowledge,
it is possible that the experimenter might be unintentionally cuing the subjects to respond in a
certain way that would fit the predictions for that condition. For example, unintentional cuing via
body language or watching the animal perform a task could affect motivation levels or
performance on the task. Moreover, the experimenter’s cuing might unexpectedly promote a
negative reaction (or the animals may refuse to work due to experimenter influences rather than
noticing and responding to the actual inequity).
In the recent exchange-based studies, there have been safeguards built in to avoid
potential cuing. Experimenters will give subjects a consistent (and typically considerable)
amount of time to respond without the experimenter feeling pressured to get the animal’s
attention, and individuals who are blind to conditions (e.g., not the experimenter collecting the
data) can code for behavioral reactions. While these procedures ensure that the experimenter and
the blind coder reliably agree on the response, it does not necessarily prevent the experimenter
from cuing in the first place. For the current study, the main focus was to avoid any experimenter
cuing by removing the interaction with the experimenter and most critically, by providing a
control to see how the monkeys responded in the complete absence of an experimenter. To
remove experimenter interaction, I implemented a computerized task instead of an exchangebased paradigm, and rewards were provided via an automatic dispenser. Also, because the
experimenter was not directly interacting with the subjects and the reward distribution was
automatic, cuing was less of a concern when the experimenter was present, too, even though the
experimenter was not blind to the condition.
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1.3.2 Relationship with the Experimenter
While we have strong evidence that animals are sensitive to cues given by experimenters
within a study, one feature that has been poorly explored is how the relationship between the
experimenter outside of the experimental context influences the subjects’ behavior in studies of
behavior and cognition. This is potentially important for tests in which experimenters create
inequity. In humans, responses to inequity differ depending on the relationship between the
individuals involved (Clark & Grote, 2003), and this may be the case in other species as well.
Although no study has directly addressed inequity, we do know that animals are sensitive to
these relationships. One study suggests that the length of time working with an animal may
influence their behavior in cognitive tasks. Corvids are sensitive to familiarity of an
experimenter, participating more often and showing better performance in an exchange task with
an experimenter with whom they have a more long-term relationship as compared to an
unfamiliar experimenter (Cibulski et al., 2014); however, the possibility of experimenter effects
cannot be ignored. Additionally, features of the experimenter may influence behavior prior to
interaction. Female dogs readily approach unfamiliar humans of either sex, but male dogs tend to
avoid unfamiliar male humans (Lore & Eisenberg, 1986).
Another consequence in captivity is that for some individuals, the interaction with the
experimenter may be more rewarding than the reward itself, which means that the responses of
the animal are not based on the reward distribution that the experimenters provide. This may be
especially likely in domesticated animals or animals that interact intensively with humans, in
which social interaction with the experimenter may have a higher value than the actual food
reward since these animals are so accustomed to human attention and affection. In addition,
because captive and domesticated animals are trained to obey human commands, animals could
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be completing the task just to please the experimenter, without paying attention to the partner’s
efforts and reward outcomes. Therefore, the opportunity to interact with a human may
overshadow any negative response or distract the animal from paying attention to a partner’s
efforts and reward outcomes. Additionally, the reaction to inequity may consequently be directed
more towards the experimenter.
In a recent inequity study, dogs responded to an unequal distribution of rewards when
tested with a conspecific, but they did not indicate sensitivity to quality of food or effort
expended (Range et al., 2009), whereas nonhuman primates have shown this sensitivity (Massen
et al., 2011; van Wolkenten et al., 2007). It has been postulated that the dogs reacted more to the
commands of experimenters rather than responding to the quality and effort inequity conditions
(Horowitz, 2012; Range et al., 2009; 2012). Therefore, it is plausible that nonhuman primates in
captivity that are used to interacting with humans and obeying human commands may be prone
to a similar phenomenon. Thus, another of the goals of this study was to begin to explore the
degree to which the animals’ relationship with the experimenter influenced their responses.
1.4

Inequity and Cooperation
It has been hypothesized that a sense of fairness evolved with cooperation. Humans with

a sense of fairness are proposed to be more likely to succeed in cooperative interactions (Fehr &
Schmidt, 1999), due to their greater ability to recognize and thus avoid cooperative interactions
or partners which are not in their best interests, such as freeloaders who will exploit a shared
effort without splitting the outcome. Many social nonhuman primate species (and those in other
taxa) also cooperate both in the wild and in laboratory experiments, and thus this link between
cooperation and inequity may exist in species besides humans (see Price & Brosnan, 2012, for an
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overview). Indeed, the current study focuses on capuchin monkeys, who cooperate both in the
wild (Rose, 1997) and in the laboratory (de Waal & Berger, 2000).
Capuchin monkeys can monitor their own contributions to a cooperative activity and the
resulting outcomes, as well as a partner’s (Brosnan, 2011), and consequently, can recognize
whether they are being exploited and determine whether to continue contributing (Hatfield et al.,
1978). Therefore, a negative response to inequity may be a signal to a partner that they are not
being fair. However, the question remains as to where the negative response is being directed –
towards the conspecific, or towards another source, such as the experimenter? Specifically, when
the monkeys complete a task with the experimenter, do they view the experimenter as the
cooperative partner, or do they view the experimenter as a mediator for a cooperative task
involving subject and partner? It presumably makes a difference in responses depending on
whether monkeys perceive themselves as cooperating with the experimenter or a conspecific.
Determining whether the negative response to inequity is directed towards the
experimenter or the conspecific can also tell us about how individuals perceive this interaction. If
an individual responds differently when an experimenter is present than when an experimenter is
absent, this indicates that they see the experimenter as the cause of the inequity, which may
indirectly imply that the individual has some understanding of human’s intentions. Humans
respond less strongly to distributions determined by a computer than by other humans (Blount,
1995), and cooperation with a human partner rather than a computer is associated with more
brain activity for striatal mechanisms related to reward (Rilling et al., 2002), demonstrating that
humans are sensitive to intentionality. Some nonhuman primates have demonstrated the ability to
understand the intentional actions of others (Call et al., 2004), so while we cannot assume similar
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underlying neural mechanisms, such similarity in outcomes would provide some evidence that
they may understand aspects of intent.
On the other hand, if subjects do not respond differently to the presence or absence of the
experimenter, then the results imply that the subjects are focused on the outcome of the
interaction, not the underlying causes (i.e., not the experimenter). This has several implications.
First, it implies that they are more outcome-focused than intent-focused, although the fact that
they respond more strongly to a partner getting an outcome than to the mere presence of a
higher-value outcome means that this is still a social response. We also cannot disentangle that
they are sensitive to intent, but are more focused on conspecifics than humans. It is interesting to
note that there may be less cause for concern over experimenter effects if subjects are insensitive
to the presence of the experimenter, not because the experimenter is not a cause of bias, but
because the subjects are not paying as much attention to the experimenter.
1.5

Purpose
In the current study, I used a novel methodology to assess whether the presence or

absence of the experimenter affects the types of responses to inequity in one species of
nonhuman primate (the capuchin monkey, Cebus apella). The primary goal of this study was to
compare the responses to inequity when an experimenter was absent from the room versus when
an experimenter was present and was “providing rewards.” There was an identical procedure for
both conditions, so the only variable that changed was whether the experimenter was physically
present, touching the reward dispensers. These results would determine whether the monkeys
were responding to the experimenter’s presence or the conspecific’s outcomes. If the monkeys
respond to inequity when an experimenter is present, but not when the experimenter is absent,
this would imply that the monkeys are responding to the experimenter’s actions, rather than the
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reward distribution. From this we could infer that the subjects are sensitive to the intent of the
individual that creates the inequity. If the subjects respond the same regardless of whether the
experimenter is present, this would imply that the monkeys are responding to the distribution, not
the actions that led to that distribution. From this we could infer that the subjects are not as
sensitive to intent or cause as they are to outcome. I do not expect the monkeys to respond to
inequity when the experimenter is absent, but to do so when the experimenter is present, due to
earlier results showing inequity when the experimenter was present (all previous studies have
involved a present experimenter). However, if the subjects respond more strongly in the absence
of an experimenter, this might imply a mediating effect of the experimenter on their willingness
to respond negatively to inequity.
In order to do this, I developed a new methodology that allowed for both a task and a
means of distribution of the food rewards to the appropriate monkey without human mediation. I
created a joint-computer task that required the monkeys to expend effort to earn rewards, which
were distributed by an automatic dispenser. Monkeys were separated from one another, which
ensured that each monkey received its intended reward.
2

2.1

GENERAL METHODS

Subjects and Housing
Data were collected on 11 capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) housed at Georgia State

University’s Language Research Center (LRC) in Atlanta, Georgia. Capuchins came from two
social groups housed at the LRC; Group 1 consisted of 2 adult males, 2 adult females, and 2
juvenile females, and Group 2 consisted of 3 adult males, 2 adult females, and 1 juvenile male.
All subjects were housed in social groups at the LRC and had indoor/outdoor access and
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extensive environmental enrichment (climbing structures, barrels, swings, and other toys). All
subjects had ad libitum access to water and were fed their usual diet consisting of primate chow,
fruits and vegetables throughout the study. At no time were the subjects food or water deprived.
No subject was tested twice in the same day.
All subjects were tested in pairs. These pairs were to remain the same throughout the
study, although individuals that did not consistently complete the task were removed from these
pairings and some individuals were re-paired (see Appendix A). All subjects participated
voluntarily, coming when called to the testing cages in their indoor living areas for the
experiment. Separating subjects out from their social group in this way limited distractions
during the experiment. Animals were initially chosen to participate in the study if they reliably
separated and had a potential partner that they tolerated from within their social group that also
reliably separated.
2.2

Computer Task
The computer task was a CHASE task, in which individuals used a joystick to move a

cursor on the computer screen so as to make contact with each of two moving green circles on
the screen. The form of the task involved a white background with red cursors and green circles
as targets. At the beginning of a trial, both circles appeared on the screen. The circles moved
randomly and independently deflected off the borders of the playing area. Each circle
disappeared when contacted with the cursor, and when both circles had been contacted, the
individual received his/her reward.
Because this was a joint task, individuals shared a split screen (a black line split the
screen in half) and each individual had a view of his/her own and the partner’s cursor
movements. Individuals alternated taking turns; when it was one player’s turn, both circles
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appeared on the playing individual’s side of the screen while the non-playing individual’s side of
the screen went blank (with no cursor). Once the playing individual completed the trial and
received the corresponding rewards, a new trial began for the partner while the other side of the
screen in turn went blank. The ITI (inter-trial interval) and the presence of a partner’s cursor
varied depending on the version of the program (see Section 3.5.1 and Table 1). Within an
individual’s turn, any continuous 30 seconds without deflecting the joystick was defined as a
“refusal.” A refusal resulted in the individual losing his/her chance to play that trial, and play
reverted back to the partner.
Table 1. Summary of modifications made across studies.
Components on Screen
Study
ITI
Playing Individual
Non-playing Individual
Studies 1-4 10 seconds Moveable cursor + targets
Blank screen
Study 5
5 seconds Moveable cursor + targets Moveable cursor, no targets

All subjects completed the same version of the CHASE task (involving touching two
moving targets with the cursor, as described above). Once an individual touched both targets, an
automatic dispenser released one of two reward types, either a low value reward (LVR - 1
reward) or a high value reward (HVR - 4 rewards). Each session involved 60 alternating trials
for each individual (i.e., 120 trials total). All sessions were run to completion. Thus, individuals’
statistics referred to the number of trials completed or refused out of 60 trials per session. Not all
pairs of monkeys completed the same number of sessions within each study (see Appendix A),
however final statistics are based on each pair’s full set of 8 completed sessions. Although
computer tasks have not been used specifically to look at the response to inequity alone, all of
the capuchin subjects had prior experience using the described CHASE task (e.g., Beran &
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Evans, 2009;Evans et al., 2008) and were used to paying attention to differential rewards through
tasks that examined economic decision-making (e.g., Brosnan et al., 2011b).
2.3

Setup
Each pair consisted of a subject and partner. Each individual in a pair was tested in both

roles. In order to ensure that rewards would be distributed to the intended individual, all subjects
were separated from their partners by a clear barrier (see Section 1.2.3). This procedure with the
barrier is consistent with previous joint-computer studies (Brosnan et al., 2011b). One concern,
as noted above, is that subjects’ responses to inequity may be influenced by proximity to the
partner, thus the barrier may inhibit reactions. However, use of the barrier was necessary to
appropriately distribute rewards, and there is evidence that capuchins will still respond to
inequity when physically separated (Brosnan et al., 2010a; Brosnan & de Waal, 2003; Fletcher,
2008; Takimoto et al., 2010; van Wolkenten et al., 2007).
Capuchin monkeys were tested in a testing box (24 in. tall, 56 in. long, 27.5 in. wide)
attached to the home enclosures. The testing box had a pair of clear panels separating the animals
from the computer apparatus, allowing the monkeys clear visual access to both their and their
partner’s side of the computer screen, with metal mesh surrounding the sides of the panel (Figure
1). A clear barrier was also used to separate the two monkeys into separate testing areas (each 28
in. long and 27.5 in. wide), but allowed them to see each other, each other’s work, and each
other’s rewards. Only one animal pair was tested at a time.
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Figure 1. Diagram of the joint testing box (front view). Joystick controllers are inserted into
the mounts (A). Reward pellets fall into the funnels (B) and travel through clear plastic tubing
(C) into reward cups (D).
The computer rested on a moveable cart. A large screen was placed at the monkey’s eyelevel to allow the animals to sit in front of the caging in their respective areas and watch a splitscreen (Figure 2). Joysticks were connected to the computer on either side of the cart, and were
inserted into mounts built into the clear front panels, allowing the animals to control a cursor
with the joystick. Two automatic reward dispensers were attached to the cart on both sides and
fruit-flavored pellets sat at the top of each reservoir. Each reward was released one-by-one from
a reward dispenser and rolled down clear tubing into one of two clear PVC pipes that were
attached to the metal mesh and positioned centrally between subject and partner, landing into an
individual’s respective reward cup that was attached to the inside of the testing box (Figures 1
and 2). The reward delivery and reward cups were visible to both individuals through the clear
barrier or mesh separation.
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Figure 2. Diagram of the joint testing box (side view). Reward pellets sit in the reservoir (A)
and are released by an automatic dispenser (B). Monkeys have a split-screen view on the
computer screen (C) and control a cursor by moving a joystick on the controller (D) to touch
moving targets.
It was vital that the monkeys could see each other’s rewards as clearly as possible. If they
did not know what their partner got, they would not realize that the outcomes were inequitable.
In previous inequity studies with the token exchange task, the experimenter would hold up each
individual’s reward so that both monkeys could see it before handing it over to the intended
individual. However, because this new methodology required automatic reward distribution, the
clear tubing and reward cups situated on either side of the barrier helped ensure the best chance
for both monkeys to see each other’s pellets being distributed automatically. Additional visual
and auditory cues were also used to make this reward delivery as noticeable as possible to both
individuals. As each reward was released from the dispenser, the rewarded player’s side of the

26

screen flashed. In addition, a tone played once for each reward earned. This tone was the same
for both individuals.
The procedure for reward distribution was the same for experimenter present and
experimenter absent conditions. In conditions in which there was a human experimenter, the
experimenter stood behind the screen. The experimenter touched the playing monkey’s
corresponding dispenser, as if she were controlling the release of the pellet into the dispenser.
The experimenter knew ahead of time which reward each individual would be receiving based on
the type of equity condition (Table 2), but she fixed her gaze at a spot on the caging during
testing; thus, she could not see the screen and the reward distribution was automatic, which
limited inadvertent cuing (see Section 1.3.1).
Table 2. Summary of the different test types and conditions.
Experimenter
condition

Number of Rewards
Test type

Low equity control
High equity control
Experimenter
present or absent

Inequity

Equity condition

Low equity
High equity
Disadvantageous
inequity
Advantageous
inequity

Subject

Partner

1
4

1
4

1

4

4

1

Prior to the beginning of testing, the monkeys were acclimated to the joint-computer
testing box setup. Whereas the capuchins previously have participated in joint-computerized
testing in smaller individual testing boxes (Brosnan et al., 2011b), as well as joint manual tasks
in the larger testing box, they had never participated in a joint-computer task in the larger testing
box. For the acclimation period, the setup was the same as described above, except that the
computer screen was not turned on and joystick controllers were not attached for the monkeys to
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manipulate (therefore, no task was required). Each monkey pair was given a total of two 10minute sessions, on separate days, in which the experimenter manually provided them pellets by
pushing the release button on the automatic dispenser. The monkeys received two pellets every
30 seconds (40 pellets in total). This also functioned to train the monkeys to associate the
experimenter with the release of rewards (although in the actual testing sessions, it would be
automatic). All sessions were videotaped with two Canon cameras, one pointing toward each
side of the testing box to capture both players’ behaviors and proximity to the joystick. The
reaction time (time it took to first touch the joystick from the start of the trial) and completion
time (time it took to touch both targets) were also recorded.
2.4

Conditions
To determine whether the monkeys responded to inequity, responses in control tests were

contrasted with responses in inequity tests (Table 2). There were four equity-type conditions: low
equity (LE), in which both players received 1 reward (1 reward for subject, 1 reward for partner),
high equity (HE), in which both players received 4 rewards (4 rewards for subject, 4 rewards for
partner), disadvantageous inequity (DI), in which the subject received less than the partner (1
reward for subject, 4 rewards for partner), and advantageous inequity (AI), in which the subject
received more than the partner (4 rewards for subject, 1 reward for partner). These four
conditions were randomized across sessions, and individuals were tested in both subject and
partner roles. In addition, there were two experimenter conditions: experimenter present and
experimenter absent. Thus, each pair of monkeys completed 8 sessions: 2 low equity, 2 high
equity, and 4 inequity (two when the subject was disadvantaged and two when the subject was
advantaged). Half of these sessions were experimenter present and the other half were
experimenter absent.
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3
3.1

STUDIES 1-5, METHODS AND RESULTS

Study 1

3.1.1 Study 1 Methods
I initially tested five pairs of monkeys (see Appendix A, Study 1) that had reliably
worked together on previous joint-computer tasks (Price et al., in prep). The computer task,
setup, and conditions were as described above.
3.1.2 Study 1 Results
Unexpectedly, 4 of 10 monkeys (affecting 3 of the 5 pairs) failed to participate in the
study, completing 0 trials within one or two sessions, and thus never received a reward. Analysis
of the video tapes revealed that these monkeys did not even approach the joystick, indicating that
this failure was not an inability to do the task per se, but an unwillingness to participate (see
Appendix A). The remaining 6 monkeys actively participated (Appendix A). Because the 4
monkeys that failed to participate represented a large proportion of the subjects and in order to
prevent experience effects, I decided to terminate the study as soon as the problem emerged,
which was after 5 of 6 pairs had completed two sessions.
3.1.3 Study 1 Discussion
This study was aborted as soon as it became apparent that there might be a problem with
the task or setup. After 2 sessions, only two of the monkeys completed, on average, more than
half of the trials in the session. To remain blind to results, I did not look at the number of refusals
after each session was completed, but upon noticing a pattern of inactivity among several
monkeys, I examined the data. The low patterns of responses could not be explained by the type
of condition (i.e., low response rates were not limited to low equity conditions or to those
individuals that were disadvantaged).These monkeys had all previously participated in joint-

29

computerized tasks with a shared screen and separate joysticks and pellet dispensers, as in the
current study; however, as the apparatus was modified (in order to maximize the degree to which
they could see their partner’s rewards) there was the possibility that their refusals were due to
unfamiliarity with the novel apparatus. To investigate this, I tested all of the pairs on a familiar
joint-computerized task that they had recently completed (the Chicken Game; Price et al., in
prep). If subjects’ performance on the Chicken Game with the new apparatus differed from the
previous study with the original apparatus, then this difference was likely caused by the
apparatus. On the other hand, if their performance was the same, then the refusal to participate
was due to some element of the current task.
3.2

Study 2

3.2.1 Study 2 Methods
For this stage, I tested the same five monkey pairs (Appendix A) on a joint economic
decision-making game called the Chicken Game (Price at al., in prep), using the same setup in
the joint testing box as in Study 1. The Chicken Game required the monkeys to make joint
decisions that would affect both of the monkeys’ payoff outcomes. Pairs shared a split-screen
view and could see their partner’s decision. At the beginning of each trial, two different icons
representing two separate strategies appeared on both players’ sides of the screen. Each
individual had to move his or her cursor to touch one of the two icons, and each player’s
selection stayed up on the screen until the monkeys received their payoff outcomes. Depending
on each individual’s selection, subject and partner received different payoff outcomes (ranging
from 0 to 4 pellets). All pairs had participated in this computerized game for the past year, but
they had never played in the joint testing box.
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In each of the previous Chicken Game sessions, all pairs had routinely completed 200
trials (the maximum number of trials offered) within two hours, so for the current study, pairs
were given two hours to complete as many trials as they could within each session. To meet
criterion, pairs had to complete two full sessions of 200 trials in this time on two separate days.
If pairs completed over 100 trials by the end of the session, I gave them another attempt the
following day; however, if pairs failed to reach 100 trials for two sessions in a row, testing was
terminated. Pairs that passed criterion were re-tested on the inequity task following the procedure
described in Study 1.
3.2.2 Study 2 Results
Three of five pairs passed criterion (Appendix A, Study 2). Of these pairs, two of the six
monkeys (affecting two of the three pairs) subsequently did not participate in the inequity task,
completing 0 trials across all sessions (Appendix A) until testing was aborted after 2 or 3
sessions.
3.2.3 Study 2 Discussion
The results suggest that the difficulties were caused by both the apparatus and the task.
Considering the first of these, two pairs were dropped from this study when they failed to reach
criterion on the Chicken Game, with which they had previous experience. This suggests that their
failure to work was due to the novel testing apparatus. Whereas each pair was provided with two
10-minute acclimation sessions receiving free rewards (see Section 2.3), no task was provided
during acclimation. This was done in part to make sure the monkeys focused on the new type of
reward distribution (receiving rewards automatically in the joint testing box rather than being
handed rewards), but meant that the apparatus was still largely novel. I also wanted to ensure that
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the monkeys paid attention to the novel type of pellet delivery, which involved the pellets
traveling through the clear tubing and landing in the reward cups.
Of the six monkeys who passed the task criterion, two individuals subsequently failed to
participate in the inequity test (Appendix A), suggesting that some aspect of the inequity task
was aversive. For the next study, I re-paired the monkeys to determine whether the difficulties on
the inequity task would persist across new pairs. Individuals were dropped from those pairs in
which either player did not pass the Chicken Game criterion or did not participate in the inequity
task following passing criterion. Three new pairs were created (two pairs using monkeys that had
both been previously tested in Studies 1 and 2, and one pair using a previously tested monkey in
Studies 1 and 2 and one that had never been tested).
3.3

Study 3

3.3.1 Study 3 Methods
I paired only monkeys that performed trials in the previous experiment and re-tested them
following the procedures described in Study 1 (Appendix A). I continued to test one pair that had
consistently met the criteria in the two previous studies. To determine whether the performance
problems were persisting across the new pairs, each pair was provided 4 sessions. Each
individual had to reach a criterion of an average of 20 completed trials over 4 sessions in order to
continue testing.
3.3.2 Study 3 Results
Six of eight individuals passed criterion for the four sessions (Appendix A, Study 3). One
failed to do so after 4 sessions, but her partner met criterion. For another pair, testing was
terminated early after two sessions. In this pair, one individual was likely to pass criterion but her
partner completed only 3 trials within two sessions. Upon inspection, this was not due to
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rewards; this individual completed only one trial when advantaged and two trials when
disadvantaged. Moreover, video footage confirmed that he only touched the joystick once in one
session and twice in the other session. Therefore, testing was terminated as soon as this
motivational problem emerged to prevent possible experience effects in both monkeys in the
pair. As a comparison, the subject with the second lowest average had completed 13 trials and 7
trials respectively in her first two sessions. Because this subject completed at least some trials in
each session, she was not dropped even though she ultimately did not pass criterion after four
sessions. The two pairs for which both monkeys passed criterion completed all 8 sessions.
For the two pairs for which both monkeys passed criterion, behavior in the subsequent
eight testing sessions did not differ across equity conditions in any of the dependent measures,
whether the experimenter was present (refusals: X2(3)=.600, p=.896; average reaction time:
X2(3)=1.8, p=.615; average completion time: X2(3)=1.5, p=.682) or absent (refusals: X2(3)=2.1,
p=.552; average reaction time: X2(3)=3.9, p=.272; average completion time: X2(3)=4.5, p=.212).
The monkeys also did not respond differently to any condition in the experimenter present versus
absent conditions for refusals (LE: z= -.730, p=.465; HE: z= -.730, p=.465; DI: z= -1.095,
p=.273; AI: z= -1.461, p=.144), average reaction time (LE: z= -1.095, p=.273; HE: z= -1.461,
p=.144; DI: z= -1.095, p=.273; AI: z= -1.826, p=.068), and average completion time (LE: z= 1.095, p=.273; HE: z= -1.461, p=.144; DI: z= -1.095, p=.273; AI: z= -.365, p=.715). An
overview of results can be found in Figures 3 and 4.

Mean # of refusals
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Figure 3. Overview of mean refusals out of 60 trials across the 8 conditions in Study 3
(n=4). Equity conditions are LE (low equity), HE (high equity), DI (disadvantageous inequity),
and AI (advantageous inequity).
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Figure 4. Overview of average reaction time and average completion time across 60 trials
in the 8 conditions in Study 3 (n=4). Equity conditions are LE (low equity), HE (high equity),
DI (disadvantageous inequity), and AI (advantageous inequity).
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3.3.3 Study 3 Discussion
Two pairs passed criterion and completed all 8 sessions of the inequity task. It is possible
that the problems experienced in Studies 1 and 2 were due to individual motivation issues,
because the individuals that were re-paired continued to work well in their new pairs. However,
individuals within the other two pairs showed low response rates, despite having worked well in
their previous pair.
The four monkeys that completed the study did not respond differently across equity
conditions or experimenter conditions. It is possible that the sample size (n=4) was too small to
find any effects, or it may also be that the task and setup prevented these monkeys from noticing
or responding to differential reward outcomes. Therefore, to clarify this issue, I decided to make
modifications in order to help the two remaining pairs who did not meet criterion and therefore
to increase the sample size. Prior to each inequity task, I tested the monkeys on the Chicken
Game for 10 minutes to rule out the possibility that a failure to participate was due to a lack of
motivation. If monkeys worked on the Chicken Game but then failed to participate in the
inequity task immediately following, it would indicate that their disinterest in participating was
due to the task, not the apparatus or a generalized lack of interest. However, if the monkeys
failed to complete the Chicken Game, this would mean that the lack of interest extended beyond
the inequity task and was a more general lack of motivation to work that day, and consequently, I
did not test them on the inequity task.
3.4

Study 4

3.4.1 Study 4 Methods
The two pairs that did not pass criterion in Study 3 were tested on the Chicken Game,
following the setup in Study 2. Individuals were provided the chance to complete as many trials
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as they could within 10 minutes to receive rewards. On average, individuals typically completed
a minimum of 60 trials within 60 minutes; therefore, the criterion was set so that if each
individual completed at least 10 trials in the 10 minutes, they were immediately tested on the
inequity task, starting with conditions that they had yet to experience.
3.4.2 Study 4 Results
One pair passed Chicken Game criterion, but immediately following, one subject in the
pair completed a low number of trials on the inequity task (5; see Appendix A, Study 4) and only
touched the joystick 6 times. Upon further inspection, this session was an advantageous inequity
condition in which this particular individual was receiving the better reward; therefore, it was
clear that this was not due to frustration due to inequity or receiving a low value reward in
comparison with the possible payoffs of four pellets in the Chicken Game (the highest reward
possibility was four pellets in both the Chicken Game and inequity task). The other pair failed to
pass criterion. Because this test requires both individuals’ input to receive rewards, either one or
both individuals did not participate long enough to reach the 10 trials (Appendix A).
3.4.3 Study 4 Discussion
Again, the results from this study indicated problems with both the apparatus and the
inequity task. One pair failed to pass the Chicken Game criterion; because this game requires
both individuals to make a selection before receiving rewards, the failure to complete the task
may have been influenced by a single monkey or both monkeys not participating. This indicated
either a dislike of the new apparatus or a more generalized lack of motivation to work. The other
pair passed the Chicken Game criterion but on the subsequent inequity task one individual failed
to participate despite receiving the better rewards. Unlike the other pair that refused to work on
either task, this individual’s pattern of behavior indicates that he was willing to participate on a
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familiar task but lost motivation to work when the task was switched to the inequity task
immediately following. Based on the collective results from Studies 1-4, I modified some
parameters of the task to help the remaining monkeys better understand it (Table 1). It is possible
that some monkeys found the ITI to be too long, which might have caused them not to view the
task as a joint task for which they should carefully pay attention to their partner’s outcomes.
Monkeys might have also been confused because the non-playing individual did not have a
cursor on his side of the screen. Therefore, the non-playing individual moved his joystick, and
when the cursor movements did not correlate with his joystick movements, he consequently
might have lost interest or become frustrated. These two factors combined might have caused
monkeys not to realize that the task was a joint task in which the players alternated turns, which
may have been a motivating factor for the lack of participation.
3.5

Study 5

3.5.1 Study 5 Methods
I modified the inequity task parameters (Table 1) by shortening the ITI to keep the
monkeys’ attention and adding a functioning cursor on the non-playing individual’s side of the
screen so that the individual might be more aware of their cursor movements versus their
partner’s cursor movements. The two pairs were tested following the setup in Study 1.
3.5.2 Study 5 Results
Both pairs completed all eight sessions (Appendix A, Study 5). When the experimenter
was present, their behavior differed across equity conditions in refusals (X2(3)=8.333, p=.040)
but not average reaction time (X2(3)=.900, p=.825) or average completion time (X2(3)=.900,
p=.825). Post-hoc analysis with Wilcoxon signed-rank tests was conducted with a Bonferroni
correction applied, resulting in a significance level set at p < .0083. With this correction, there
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were no significant differences between any of the equity conditions. When the experimenter
was absent, the monkeys’ behavior did not differ across equity conditions (refusals: X2(3)=3.9,
p=.272; average reaction time: X2(3)=6.30, p=.098; average completion time: X2(3)=1.5, p=.682).
They also did not respond differently to any condition in the experimenter present versus absent
conditions for refusals (LE: z= .000, p=1; HE: z= -1.069, p=.285; DI: z= -.272, p=.785; AI: z= 1.826, p=.068), average reaction time (LE: z= -.730, p=.465; HE: z= -.730, p=.465; DI: z= 1.461, p=.144; AI: z= .000, p=1), and average completion time (LE: z= -.730, p=.465; HE: z= .730, p=.465; DI: z= -1.095, p=.273; AI: z= -.730, p=.465). An overview of results can be found
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in Figures 5 and 6.
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Figure 5. Overview of mean refusals out of 60 trials across the 8 conditions in Study 5
(n=4). Equity conditions are LE (low equity), HE (high equity), DI (disadvantageous inequity),
and AI (advantageous inequity).
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Figure 6. Overview of average reaction time and average completion time across 60 trials
in the 8 conditions in Study 5 (n=4). Equity conditions are LE (low equity), HE (high equity),
DI (disadvantageous inequity), and AI (advantageous inequity).

3.5.3 Study 5 Discussion
With the modifications, two additional pairs of monkeys completed all 8 sessions of the
inequity task. Given that I found no statistically significant comparisons (except the overall
Friedman’s for Study 5, for which there were no significant comparisons following Bonferroni
corrections), I combined the data from Study 3 and Study 5 to increase the sample size and re-ran
the analyses.
3.6

Combined Data

3.6.1 Combined Data Results
I analyzed the combined data using factorial repeated-measures GLM. I conducted
analyses across the full 60 trials for refusals, average reaction time, and average completion time
(see Figures 7 and 8 for overview). For all results reported, the assumption of sphericity was met.
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Experimenter presence or absence did not have a significant effect on any dependent
variables (refusals: X2(1)=2.17, p=.14; average reaction time: X2(1)=.74, p=.39; average
completion time: X2(1)=.65, p=.42). The type of equity condition did have a significant effect on
refusals (X2(3)=14.59, p=.002) but not average reaction time (X2(3)=4.96, p=.17) or average
completion time (X2(3)=2.74, p=.43). There were no interactions between experimenter and
equity condition for any of the dependent variables (refusals: X2(3)=.43, p=.93; average reaction
time: X2(3)=3.22, p=.36; average completion time: X2(3)=1.35, p=.72). Planned contrasts
revealed that subjects refused significantly more in the low equity condition compared to any
other condition, b = -3.33, t(42) = -2.63, p=.012 (Table 4). After collapsing the data to compare
performance as a function of absolute food amounts, subjects’ refusals differed significantly
depending on whether they received a single reward or four rewards, z= -2.1, p=.036.
I also examined whether refusal rates changed across time as the session progressed.
Refusal rates significantly decreased across trials in the high equity condition (rs(960) = -.147,
p<.001) and low equity condition (rs(960) = -.149, p<.001), but not the advantageous inequity
condition (rs(960) = -.010, p=.751) nor the disadvantageous inequity condition (rs(960) = -.052,
p=.107). Comparing the correlation coefficients from each condition confirmed the above
findings. The correlation between refusal rates across the duration of the session in the high
equity condition differed significantly from the correlations between refusal rates across the
duration of the session in the disadvantageous inequity condition (z= -2.1, p=.036) and the
advantageous inequity condition (z= -3.02, p=.003) but not the low equity condition (z= 0.04,
p=.968). The correlation between refusal rates across the duration of the session in the low
equity condition differed significantly from the correlation between refusal rates across the
duration of the session in the disadvantageous inequity condition (z= -2.15, p=.032) and the
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advantageous inequity condition (z= -3.07, p=.002). The correlations between refusal rates
across the duration of the session in the advantageous inequity condition and the
disadvantageous inequity condition did not differ significantly, z= -0.92, p=.358.
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Figure 7. Overview of mean refusals out of 60 trials across the 8 conditions in Studies 3 and
5 (combined data, n=8). Equity conditions are LE (low equity), HE (high equity), DI
(disadvantageous inequity), and AI (advantageous inequity).
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Figure 8. Overview of average reaction time and average completion time across 60 trials
in the 8 conditions in Studies 3 and 5 (combined data, n=8). Equity conditions are LE (low
equity), HE (high equity), DI (disadvantageous inequity), and AI (advantageous inequity).
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Table 3. Results for analysis of contrasts for refusals. Equity conditions are LE (low equity),
HE (high equity), DI (disadvantageous inequity), and AI (advantageous inequity). Refusals in the
low equity condition differed significantly from any other condition, b = -3.33, t(42) = -2.63,
p=.012.
Contrast
b
SEb
df
t
p
Experimenter
Present vs.
-2.84
1.79
7
-1.59
0.16
Absent
LE vs. other
-3.33
1.26
42
-2.63
0.012
conditions
DI vs. AI
4.88
5.06
42
0.96
0.34
DI vs. other
-0.42
2.19
42
-0.19
0.85
conditions

3.6.2 Combined Data Discussion
Overall, the pattern of results suggests that monkeys were sensitive to receiving a single
reward, but were not sensitive to either their reward as compared to their partner’s (i.e., equity
versus inequity) or the presence of the experimenter. In the combined data, I found that the
overall number of refusals differed significantly across equity conditions, and the monkeys
refused the most when both individuals were receiving a low value reward. Moreover, although
this was not statistically significant, monkeys also refused at high rates when disadvantaged as
compared to a partner, which was the other condition in which they received a single reward,
suggesting that the monkeys were sensitive to getting a single reward as opposed to the four
rewards. Indeed, this was confirmed after analyzing performance as a function of food amounts,
which revealed that the monkeys’ refusals differed significantly depending on what amount of
reward they received. Additionally, in no condition did the subjects’ behavior change depending
on whether the experimenter was present.
However, there was one finding that hints to the possibility that subjects were responding
to the relative equity of the rewards. Although the overall number of refusals did not differ
across conditions, the rate of refusal did. In the combined data, the subjects’ rate of refusal did
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not change in the two conditions that resulted in unequal outcomes, whether they were
advantaged (AI) or disadvantaged (DI). On the other hand, they were less likely to refuse across
the course of the session in the two conditions that resulted in equal outcomes, whether they
received the preferred outcome (HE) or the less preferred one (LE), possibly indicating a social
facilitation effect when their outcome matched their partner’s. This finding is the one indication
that the subjects noticed when their outcome differed from their partner’s, regardless of whether
they were relatively advantaged or disadvantaged. This result hints that this procedure might
yield valuable insights with a larger sample size and an adapted procedure that takes in to
account the changes that were in place in Study 5.
4

GENERAL DISCUSSION

My hypothesis that monkeys’ responses would be influenced by the presence of the
experimenter was not supported. Monkeys’ behavior did not change in any condition depending
on whether the experimenter was present or absent. However, it may still be surprising that the
presence of the experimenter did not change their willingness to work and/or accept rewards
(even if this was independent of the reward inequity, or lack thereof) for several reasons. First, it
remains unclear what role the experimenter may play in a social interaction. On the one hand, the
experimenter may provide additional cues that the context is a social one, causing the subjects to
pay more attention. On the other hand, the experimenter may be distracting, as a recent study
suggests; macaques performed significantly better on an object-choice task when the
experimenter was hidden behind a curtain and only the arm of the experimenter was visible,
suggesting that the presence of the experimenter distracted the monkeys away from the salient
cues in the task (Schmitt et al., 2014). Second, whereas the procedures and apparatus were
carefully constructed so as to remove interaction with the experimenter and prevent cuing, it is
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challenging to eliminate all unintentional cuing. Whereas I tried to stay as consistent as possible
in my movements as the experimenter and maintain my gaze straight ahead during testing,
nonhuman primates are sensitive to eye movements (Povinelli & Eddy, 1996) and animals may
be sensitive to subtle body movements (Johnson, 1913), such as respiration, posture, and the
tensing and relaxing of muscles - processes that would be impossible for an experimenter to have
full control over. Moreover, it is possible that the monkeys’ unwillingness to work provided
experimental feedback that negatively affected my mood, which conceivably could have further
influenced unintentional cuing and changed monkeys’ behavior (perhaps leading them to work
less in the presence of the experimenter). Third, I have had years of experience with these
monkeys and they are familiar with interacting with me, both in terms of experimental and
husbandry-type interactions. Consequently, because capuchin monkeys can discriminate humans
(Paukner et al., 2009), there was a risk that my past experience with these monkeys might
influence their perception of me as the experimenter, and I thought they might be more willing to
work in my presence because they are used to receiving rewards from me. So while on the one
hand this is surprising, on the other hand it is good news that the experimenter’s presence does
not always influence behavior.
A second area of interest is why we did not see a strong response to inequity in this study,
as has been found in some others (Brosnan et al., 2010b; Brosnan & de Waal, 2003; Fletcher,
2008; Takimoto et al., 2010; Takimoto & Fujita, 2011; Talbot et al., in prep; van Wolkenten et
al., 2007; but see Fontenot et al., 2007; Silberberg et al., 2009; Talbot et al., in prep). In this
study, the monkeys’ responses seem to have been more strongly driven by their own immediate
outcomes rather than how their outcomes compared to their partner’s (as measured by their
overall refusal rate). However, the correlations examining refusal rates across the duration of the
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different sessions suggest that the monkeys were at least noticing inequity, even if they did not
refuse more often overall in the inequity conditions. Refusal rates did not change over time in
either disadvantageous or advantageous inequity conditions, but the monkeys refused less often
across trials in the low equity and high equity conditions. This outcome is intriguing for several
reasons. First, it was independent of the subject’s actual outcome. This change was based on
whether their outcome matched their partner’s, not what they got. Second, it was equally strong
whether they were more advantaged than a partner or less advantaged. This may indicate that
what affected their behavior was the degree to which their outcome was the same as a partner’s,
possibly indicating that different foods are less preferred regardless of one’s absolute or relative
outcomes. Given evidence for both inequity (Brosnan et al., 2010b; Brosnan & de Waal, 2003;
Fletcher, 2008; Takimoto et al., 2010; Takimoto & Fujita, 2011; Talbot et al., in prep; van
Wolkenten et al., 2007) and prosocial behavior (Brosnan et al., 2010a; Lakshminarayanan &
Santos, 2008) in capuchins in previous studies, this is a possibility that deserves further
exploration.
A critical question is why the subjects did not respond to inequity in this task. First, there
is an indication that they noticed it based on the change in refusal rates across sessions, which
mirrors earlier findings with capuchins (Brosnan & de Waal, 2004). However, there were no
changes in overall refusal rates as in other capuchin studies with different reward distributions.
There are several possibilities for this. First, as discussed in Section 1.2.3, subjects’ orientation
and physical proximity may influence the animals’ behavior. In fact, recent evidence from
another study using a traditional token exchange procedure suggests that the same capuchin
subjects did not respond to inequity when a barrier separated individuals, but they did respond in
at least some circumstances once this barrier was removed (Talbot et al., in prep). Of course,
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other studies have shown that capuchins do respond to inequity when separated by a barrier
(Brosnan & de Waal, 2003; Brosnan et al., 2010b; van Wolkenten et al., 2007). Additionally,
Talbot and colleagues found that these monkeys did not respond to differences in quantity of the
same food, whether or not there was a barrier. However, monkeys do discriminate and respond to
the difference between one and four pellets, as this same magnitude is used in the Chicken Game
(Price et al., in prep). In the Chicken Game, these differences in rewards are associated with
additional cues; each monkey in the pair chooses an icon that represents a strategy, and the
resulting combination of chosen icons is displayed on the screen as the monkeys receive their
corresponding rewards. Therefore, it is less likely that the magnitude of food rewards was
problematic, but that the monkeys could not associate how their behavior resulted in a certain
reward outcome.
One major challenge to this work was the subjects’ disinterest in participating. This study
provided evidence that the apparatus setup and the task both contributed to the problem.
Regarding the former, in several cases, videotape analysis revealed that the monkeys were not
even approaching the joystick, suggesting that it was not the task (which they never tried) that
influenced their decision. In Study 2, some pairs failed criterion on a familiar task with which
they had had previous success, again indicating that the novel testing apparatus was problematic.
Despite receiving an acclimation period without a required task, subjects did not experience
actually using the apparatus prior to testing. This was done to prevent any possible contrast
effects, in which the monkeys would compare their testing experience to the acclimation period
(which may have been problematic if their first exposure with the setup mimicked an equity
session with an experimenter present). In retrospect, giving them prior exposure to the task with
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the new apparatus would have been a beneficial prerequisite, and would have alerted me to the
problems much earlier.
Moreover, the nature of the task may have influenced the low performance rates,
although it is unclear which aspect was specifically problematic. There was an indication that the
inequity task was problematic when, even after monkeys passed criterion for the Chicken Game,
several subsequently failed to participate on the inequity task. One possibility is the alternation
inherent in the task. The alternating inequity task was largely structured off a previous study, in
which these same monkey subjects received extensive training to learn how to alternate taking
turns on the CHASE task to reward their partner (Parrish et al., in prep). Although subjects in the
previous study required significant training, they were able to learn it and as a result, I did not
expect that these monkeys would have difficulty with another alternating task. The results in
Study 5 point to two possible influences, the ITI and the presence of a second functional cursor
for the non-playing monkey. Considering the first of these, monkeys certainly improved when
the ITI was shortened from 10 seconds to 5 seconds in Study 5. However, in Parrish and
colleagues’ study, monkeys were ultimately able to wait as long as two minutes between turns.
Whereas their study required significantly more scaffolding to reach these long ITIs, I still find it
unlikely that the ITI alone influenced subjects’ behavior so significantly.
The other difference was that in the testing phase of Parrish et al. (in prep), the nonplaying individual’s cursor was frozen in place, whereas in the current study (Studies 1-4), the
non-playing individual’s cursor was completely absent. Because the non-playing individual did
not have a cursor on his/her side of the screen, s/he may have been confused about whether s/he
was controlling the movement on the screen, and s/he may have become frustrated if these
movements did not correlate with touching the joystick. Supporting this, adding a functional
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cursor for the non-playing monkey was one of the changes linked to increased success in Study
5.
Whereas the issues with the ITI and the cursor cannot be disentangled, it is possible that
in the current study, the alternating inequity task was not perceived as a joint task, in which both
individuals should have paid attention to each other’s performance and reward outcomes. It is
also possible that the monkeys do not perceive the split screen in the way that I expected them to.
Perhaps a more suitable task would be one that was more cooperative and required both players’
inputs. For example, the monkeys could work on a single screen with different cursors and both
individuals would be required to chase the same moving target to touch it. This might be more
analogous to a task that requires both players to coordinate expended efforts to obtain rewards.
Another limitation to this study was finding the balance between staying blind to the
results as the study progressed and monitoring possible procedural problems to potentially adapt
the paradigm in the middle of the study. As discussed in the introduction, there is always a risk
that an experimenter may form a bias based on how the study is progressing, causing
expectancies for future behavior (Rosenthal & Fode, 1963). For example, if data support a
hypothesis, it might cause the experimenter to exaggerate an interpretation. If data contradict the
hypothesis, it might change the mood of the experimenter, who may emit unintentional cues or
test additional subjects to increase power. For example, in the current study, I expected the
monkeys to perceive the alternating task as a social one in which their partner mattered,
however, without testing the monkeys in partner-absent conditions, it was impossible to know
for sure. I also expected the monkeys to complete a certain number of trials for each session
based on their efficiency on other computer tasks, therefore, I interpreted the low number of
trials completed in sessions as problematic. On the other hand, it may be beneficial to track
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performance on a novel task in order to determine whether subjects understand the contingencies
of the task; this is especially important in animal research in which the subjects cannot ask
questions for clarification or give feedback on what may have been confusing. Therefore, there
needs to be a balance in the risk of experimenter bias and in the risk of poor performance on an
unknown task.
One way to approach this problem is by creating objective criteria ahead of time in
anticipation of problems, which requires tracking results to an extent but is established before
testing has begun. However, this type of computerized inequity study with the joint testing box
apparatus had never been attempted before, and so it was difficult to create criterion considering
all of these new factors. In fact, based on results from Parrish et al. (in prep), it was expected that
the monkeys were familiar and successful with the alternating CHASE task and were willing to
wait for long periods in between receiving rewards, so it was surprising that the monkeys were
not willing to work on this task. Also, because it was a computerized study, I assumed that the
monkeys would complete a high number of trials because they easily complete 200 trials in other
types of joint tasks (e.g. the Chicken Game).
Therefore, as the experimenter, I took the approach of staying as blind as possible to
performance across the type of equity conditions and only examined the data once it became
clear that several monkeys were not working. At this point, I did not want to give monkeys
further negative experience if the apparatus or task was aversive or frustrating to several
subjects. For this particular study, I believed it was beneficial to adapt the paradigm as problems
persisted and it appeared likely early in the study that multiple subjects would not meet criterion.
Often times, subjects were not even completing a single trial in order to determine what reward
they were receiving, and as the comparison of rewards was the main requirement for inequity, it
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was crucial to fix this problem as soon as possible. One of the problems with my approach was
that different subjects received different numbers of sessions, so each subject had different
experiences. This made it impossible to compare subjects’ performance, meaning that even
though I ultimately had four pairs complete the task, it is not clear how subjects may have been
influenced differently by this different experience. In the future I would begin by testing all
pairs on the same sub-selection of four conditions (in randomized order) and establish a criterion
for average number of responses (as in Study 3); with this method, all pairs would receive the
same experience with the number of sessions and types of conditions, and I could more properly
assess differences among performances.
Of course the aforementioned problems with implementing the study make it difficult to
extrapolate further; however, I note that the finding that the experimenter did not influence the
subjects’ behavior (irrespective of inequity condition) is not unprecedented. Previous research
found that capuchins did not learn to prefer more reliable experimenters over those who cheated
them (e.g., gave them less than anticipated; Brosnan & de Waal, 2009; Sheskin et al., 2013), so
these studies combined with my current results suggest that capuchins are not particularly
sensitive to either the experimenter’s intent to cheat them (e.g., provide less than offered;
Brosnan & de Waal, 2009; Sheskin et al., 2013) or to their intent to cause inequity (e.g., the
current results). This may be different from chimpanzees, who do learn reputation (Russell et
al., 2008; Subiaul et al., 2008) and therefore might be expected to respond differently based on
the presence or absence of an experimenter.
Future research will be required to explore these questions further. Whereas there was
tentative evidence that subjects in my study noticed inequity, suggesting the utility of a new
study with a larger sample size, it is difficult to understand what our findings mean. Nonetheless,
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experimenter effects remain an important area of research, especially when working with
animals, and require further attention. Because it is virtually impossible to remove the
experimenter from the experiment in all testing situations, researchers should have a better
understanding of what role the experimenter plays overall in an attempt to control for these
effects as much as possible. Moreover, the relationship between human experimenters and their
animal subjects is fascinating in and of itself, and has important implications beyond research,
such as how we can improve life in captivity for animal subjects.
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APPENDICES
Appendix A
Summary of pairs’ performances across studies. Sessions were always run to completion, so all measures of trials completed are out of 60 trials. Study 1 includes
the number of trials completed on the inequity task and number of joystick touches for pairs that completed 0 of the 60 trials. Study 2 includes whether pairs
passed Chicken Game criterion (completing two full sessions of 200 trials within two hours on two separate days); if pairs passed criterion, the number of trials
completed on the subsequent inequity task is indicated (as well as the number of joystick touches for subjects that completed 0 of 60 trials). Study 3 includes the
average number of trials completed over four sessions (criterion required an average of 20 trials), and the average number of trials completed over 8 sessions for
the two pairs that completed the study. An asterisk indicates that the session was terminated early, based on only two sessions of 60 trials. Study 4 includes
whether pairs passed the Chicken Game criterion (completing at least 10 trials in 10 minutes) and the number of trials completed in the subsequent inequity task
for individuals that passed criterion. Study 5 includes the average number of trials completed over the 8 sessions for the two pairs that completed the study.
Pair
Study 1
Study 2
Study 3
Study 4
Study 5
Passed
Avg. # trials
Passed
Chicken
Avg. # of trials
# times joystick
# times joystick
completed over
Passed
# trials
criterion?
Game
completed over
# trials
touched (for
touched (for
8 sessions (for 2
Chicken
completed
(avg. of 20
criterion?;
8 sessions (for 2
completed
sessions with
sessions with
pairs that
Game
for inequity
responses
# trials
pairs that
(/60)
0/60 trials
0/60 trials
completed
criterion?
task (/60)
over 4
completed
completed
completed)
completed)
study)
sessions)
for inequity
study)
task (/60)
Gambit
19; 12
--Yes (within
9; 55
--Yes; 41.5
43.5
----6 sessions)
Nkima
24; 11
--28; 26
--Yes; 32.75
26.9
Wren
4
--No
------------Lily
26
--Liam
14; 60
--No
------------Logan
14; 0
0
Drella
54; 31
--Yes (within
59; 27
----------3 sessions)
Griffin
0; 0
5; 0
0; 0
6; 0
Gabe
0; 0
0; 1
Yes (within
0; 0; 0
3; 0; 0
--------3 sessions)
Nala
0; 50
0
35; 4; 60
--Liam
No; 1.5*
45
------------No
Nala
Yes; 37*
46.6
Wren
Yes; 22.8
28.5
--------------Drella
Yes; 39.5
38.9
Widget
Yes; 29.5
Yes; 31
45
------------Lily
No; 5.75
Yes; 5
16.6

